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Philosophy and T heology
This reflection takes up recent literature on sex selection of children, especially 
by abortion, and the right of children to be loved. Many pro-choice advocates hold 
that sex-selective abortion (SSA) is morally problematic, if not impermissible. Many 
arguments against sex-selective abortion, like those presented below by J.M. Mil- 
liez in “Sex Selection for Non-Medical Purposes” (Reproductive Medicine Online, 
February 2007) only make sense on the implicit assumption that the human fetus 
is a person with rights, but this premise renders problematic not just sex-selective 
abortion but abortion generally. Wishing to avoid this implicit assumption, Wendy 
Rogers, Angela Ballantyne, and Heather Draper in their article “Is Sex-Selective 
Abortion Morally Justified and Should It Be Prohibited?” (Bioethics, November 2007) 
provide several arguments that sex-selective abortion is wrong, without endorsing 
(even implicitly) the intrinsic value of the human fetus as female or male. This ap­
proach, I will argue, is problematic. A better approach to the question of the moral 
permissibility of sex-selective abortion, and abortion generally, can be found in S. 
Matthew Liao’s article “The Right of Children to Be Loved” (Journal o f Political 
Philosophy, December 2006) on the right of children to receive the unconditional 
love of their parents.
Sex selection can occur in three ways: prior to conception by sperm separation, 
after conception but before implantation through genetic diagnosis of IVF embryos, 
and after implantation by abortion. In a consideration of sex selection outside the 
context of genetically sex-linked diseases, Milliez notes in his article that the first 
“technique [i.e., sperm separation] raises very few ethical objections. . . . In 2001, 
the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) 
considered that, in the absence of robust arguments in favor of any potential harm, 
preconception sex selection was not hazardous and therefore any ban would be 
unjustified” (114).
Less ethical consensus exists about sex selection after conception through 
selection and implantation of only male (or female) embryos. Some defend it as an
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exercise of “procreative liberty,”1 but others condemn it as discrimination against 
gender equality.1 2 This sex selection by pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is forbid­
den by law in India, South Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and ten other 
European countries.
The third technique of sex selection is most widespread and the most con­
demned—abortion of the male or female fetus sometime into pregnancy. Detection 
and eradication of the developing female (or male) fetus can occur quite early in 
pregnancy. “A single blood sample is sufficient to recognize the embryo as male 
or female as early as the first weeks of pregnancy, enabling the elimination of any 
embryo of undesirable sex with an anti-progesterone medication. However, this 
method is strictly restricted to the screening of sex-linked genetic disorders or the 
management of Rhesus immunization. Its use for sex selection for personal conve­
nience is unanimously banned” (Milliez, 115).
Unanimously banned is not accurate, as abortion for sex selection remains 
legal in many places, among them the United States and Canada, where abortion is 
legal for any reason. It is true, however, that many people who describe themselves 
as pro-choice nevertheless oppose sex-selective abortion. “Nearly all societies of 
reproductive medicine, including the American College of Obstetricians and Gyne­
cologists __ , are opposed to sex-selection abortion” (Milliez, 116). However, from
a pro-choice perspective, there is some difficulty in explaining why fetal killing for 
gender preference should be wrong. Indeed, some of the arguments given for con­
demnation of sex-selective abortion would seem to apply equally to sperm separation 
or pre-implantation selection, which is often defended on grounds of reproductive 
liberty. Other arguments against sex-selective abortion apply equally to all kinds of 
abortion. Of course, it is consistent simply to say that any abortion, chosen for any 
reason including wanting not to give birth to a girl, is ethically permissible, but rela­
tively few people who call themselves pro-choice embrace this consistent position.
In their article, Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper provide several arguments that 
sex-selective abortion is wrong, a view that many think is compatible with a general 
defense of abortion. They therefore accept the “argument that we should try to un­
derstand women’s decision to use SSA and empathize with the unjust choice they are 
forced to make, without accepting that the practice itself is morally justified” (522).
Their first argument concludes that sex-selective abortion is wrong because, on 
either a broad or a narrow interpretation of autonomous choice, sex-selective abor­
tion practiced in countries with a strong preference for a son is not an autonomous 
choice. Society puts tremendous pressure on women to have male children, thereby 
undermining the preferences they would otherwise have.
1 A. Malpani, A. Malpani, and D. Modi, “Preimplantation Sex Selection for Family 
Balancing in India,” Human Reproduction 17.1 (January 2002): 11-12. Ethics Committee 
of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, “Preconception Gender Selection for 
Nonmedical Reasons,” Fertility and Sterility 75.5 (May 2001): 861-864.
2 J. Savulescu, “Sex Selection: The Case For” Medical Journal o f  Australia 171.7 
(October 1999): 373-375.
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The first thing to note is that sex-selective abortion is not considered wrong 
in itself by these authors, but only wrong in the circumstances of a certain cultural 
context. They simply do not consider the ethics of someone, for example, in Indiana 
who aborts a boy because of a preference for a girl. What would or would not count 
as the relevant “cultural context” is similarly not taken up. What if you were from 
India but now live in Indianapolis? What if you split time between both places and 
are, by birth and heritage, multicultural? It seems odd to hinge the ethics of killing 
human beings prior to birth on cultural context.
Second, the suppressed premise in the argument seems to be that whatever is 
not an autonomous choice is morally wrong.3 Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper give 
no argument for this premise. If the premise were accepted, it would be the case 
that many abortions as now performed in the United States (not just sex-selective 
abortion in India or China) are morally wrong because they are not freely chosen by 
women but rather only submitted to under pressure from other people.4
The authors also appeal to other considerations in condemning sex-selective 
abortion: “A second and separate reason why SSA is morally unjustified relates to 
the harms that attach to the practice. These include perpetuation of discrimination 
against women, disruption to social and familial networks, and increased violence 
against women” (522).
First, there is an appeal to justice, a justice violated by discrimination. Milliez 
registers this objection to sex-selective abortion seemingly on behalf of the female 
fetus herself: “Elimination of girls is philosophically and morally unacceptable if 
perceived as a gender discrimination practice contrary to the principle of equality 
and in conflict with Kant’s moral [teaching] and the notion that all children must be 
considered as an end, not as a means” (117). Likewise, the International Federation of 
Gynecology and Obstetrics issued a statement, reproduced in Milliez’s article, which 
expressed “concerns about the selection for children with presumed gender charac­
teristics desired by their parents rather than being an end in and of themselves” (116). 
Sex-selective abortion is wrong because it is a form of unjust discrimination.
The question is, against whom is this unjust discrimination practiced? Given 
a denial of fetal personhood, the discrimination in question cannot be against the 
human fetus herself or himself. Discrimination is only problematic when practiced 
against persons who merit equal and just treatment. To discriminate between non­
persons—plucking the red roses but leaving the white, for example—is not ethically
3 It is unclear whether Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper are addressing the objective 
morality of the act or the subjective responsibility of the agent. I have assumed here that they 
are addressing the former, since they, as the title of the article suggests, primarily addresses 
the question of whether sex-selective abortion is morally justified and should be prohibited. 
If the point is simply that those who choose sex-selective abortion in certain contexts are 
coerced into choices they would rather not have made, then their point is not controversial, 
or limited to sex-selective abortion.
4 For evidence for this empirical claim, see for example, the literature cited at “Abor­
tion is the Unchoice,” http://www.unfairchoice.info/pblresearch.htm.
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problematic in itself, since these plants do not have rights nor merit equal respect as 
persons. Since the human fetus is not considered a person on the typical pro-choice 
view, concerns about discrimination against the human fetus should not be relevant 
in considering actions taken against humans prior to birth.
However, if the male or female fetus is a person, then not just sex-selective 
abortion, but abortion in general becomes problematic. Taken at face value, the 
quotation from Milliez renders all abortion morally condemnable: “All children 
must be considered as an end, not as a means” (117). On the other hand, if abortion 
in general does not end the lives of “girls” and “children,” to use Milliez’s language, 
then sex-selective abortion cannot be problematic on this ground. The pro-choice 
view generally is that we can accord women the respect they deserve as ends in 
themselves without extending this respect to female human beings in utero. Obvi­
ously, if all human females (and males) merit respect as ends in themselves regardless 
of age or state of dependence, then not just sex-selective abortion but all abortion is 
problematic. On the other hand, if the female fetus is not a person, then presumably 
one can respect the rights of adult female human beings and nevertheless kill fetal 
female human beings.
Rather than appeal to discrimination against the fetus herself, Rogers, Ballan- 
tyne, and Draper ground the wrongness of sex-selective abortion in terms of its per­
petuating discriminatory views, such as that girls are worthless burdens whose births 
should be prevented. As such, sex-selective abortion is viewed as a discriminatory 
and oppressive practice that fails to accord women the respect they deserve (522).
Given current cultural milieus, this rationale covers not sex-selective abor­
tion of males, but only of females. In addition, no developed account is given for 
the questionable assumption that sex-selective abortion perpetuates discriminatory 
views which negatively affect women and girls in society. Indeed, some have sug­
gested that widespread sex-selective abortion of females prior to birth would seem 
not to decrease the value of women but rather to increase their perceived value. In 
the words of Milliez, “The profound gender imbalance [in India and China] has led 
to a dramatic scarcity of girls, who are now regarded as most valuable” (115). Of 
course, a sound understanding of the human person would not accord value to him 
or her in terms of being wanted or unwanted by others, but rather would recognize 
the intrinsic value of all human beings. Human beings should not be valued accord­
ing to the laws of supply and demand (“being wanted”) as if they were commercial 
goods, but rather should be valued for their inherent dignity. But this premise leads 
to a condemnation of abortion generally.
Finally, Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper appeal to the bad consequences of 
sex-selective abortion: “Further harm from SSA lies in the resultant severe imbal­
ance in the sex ratio, leading to millions of men being unable to find a partner and 
found a family. ... The likely social effects are thought to include increased criminal 
behavior and social disruption with banditry, violence and revolutions historically 
more common in areas with large numbers of excess males” (522).
I believe that it is correct that sex-selective abortion as practiced in India and 
China harms those societies. But the defender of abortion must be careful not to rely 
too heavily on the premise that sex-selective abortion is wrong and may be outlawed
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on this basis. Evidence has been adduced that abortion generally is harmful to so­
ciety: psychologically, physically, and socially harmful to the women who undergo 
abortions and harmful to the culture that allows its weakest and most vulnerable 
members to be terminated by private force. 5 Given this evidence, not just sex-selec­
tive abortion but also abortion for other reasons violates the common good.
However, some defenders of abortion appeal to the good of society in justify­
ing abortion, arguing that abortion reduces population and thereby promotes the 
common good. Given these assumptions, sex-selective abortion of females would 
be particularly good for society, since a disproportionate reduction in females limits 
population much more effectively than an equal reduction of male and female. One 
male can father virtually limitless numbers of children, but each woman can only 
bear relatively few. Women are the limiting factor in reproduction. Since one man 
can father more children in a month than any woman could bear in an entire lifetime, 
the most effective way to reduce population is to reduce the number of women.
A final reason given to oppose sex-selective abortion is that it leads to an in­
crease in violence against women. Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper admit that this 
connection is based on merely anecdotal evidence. However, even if sex-selective 
abortion does increase the likelihood of violence against women, evidence has also 
been given that abortion generally is connected with increased violence against 
women.6 Thus, the rationale given to condemn sex-selective abortion may apply 
equally to abortion undertaken for other reasons.
Many of these consequences would arise equally from the non-existence of adult 
women from the other forms of sex selection such as sperm separation or implantation 
of IVF embryos of the desired sex. If aborting a female perpetuates discriminatory 
views about women, why would sperm selection to preclude conception of a female 
be any different? If disruption of gender balance alone is decisive for condemna­
tion of sex-selective abortion, why does it matter if this imbalance arises because of 
sperm separation or sex-selective abortion? As noted earlier, many individuals and 
groups hold that sex selection prior to conception is morally unproblematic, but the 
societal ills recognized by Rogers, Ballantyne, Draper and others also would also 
take place if the gender imbalance occurred through sperm separation.
In his article “The Right of Children to Be Loved,” Liao considers the ques­
tion of the ethics of sex selection. He argues that it is not mere rhetoric but a matter 
of justice that children receive love from others. Love can be commanded, and to 
love another can be a moral duty. Further, he proposes that this right of a child to 
be loved is a human right. Children need to be loved to develop essential capacities 
that they need for a good life. Liao writes,
5 See Thomas W. Strahan, ed., Detrimental Effects o f Abortion: An Annotated Bibli­
ography With Commentary, 3rd ed. (Springfield, IL: Acorn Publishing, 2001); and Robert 
Spitzer, Healing the Culture: A Commonsense Philosophy o f  Happiness, Freedom and the 
Life Issues (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000).
6 See Strahan, Detrimental Effects, sections 3.38-3.43.
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Human beings have rights to those conditions that are . . . essential for a good 
life. As human beings, children therefore have rights to those conditions that 
are . . . essential for a good life. Being loved is a condition that is . . . essential 
for children to have a good life. Therefore, children have a right to be loved. To 
explicate this argument, let me begin by characterizing the kind of love at issue, 
namely, parental love, which has the following characteristics: To love a child 
is to seek a highly intense interaction with the child, where one values the child 
for the child’s sake, where one seeks to bring about and to maintain physical and 
psychological proximity with the child, where one seeks to promote the child’s 
well-being for the child’s sake, and where one desires that the child reciprocate 
or, at least, is responsive to, one’s love. One important feature of parental love 
is valuing the child for the child’s sake. As a child psychologist Mia Pringle 
argues: “The basic and all-pervasive feature of parental love is that the child is 
valued unconditionally and for his own sake, irrespective o f his sex, appearance, 
abilities or personality; that this love is given without expectation of or demand 
for gratitude.” (422, emphasis added)
Liao’s argument is quite important for a number of reasons. First, he provides a 
philosophical rationale for a right to be loved that is asserted in a number of interna­
tional declarations, but seldom argued for. Second, if his argument is correct, it may 
cause some difficulties for defenders of Judith Jarvis Thompson’s violinist argument 
for abortion. In the violinist argument, the personhood of the human fetus is not 
denied, but what is denied is a duty of responsibility of the mother to promote the 
well-being of her child.7 However, if parents do have duties to their children, these 
duties may include gestation of the children prior to birth. In contrast to Thomp­
son, who posits that the first stages of motherhood are like being hooked up to an 
unrelated, adult violinist, Liao provides reasons to believe that a mother (or father) 
does have duties toward their own children. Finally, the duty of parents to love their 
children, and to value them irrespective of their sex, indicates perhaps the primary 
reason why sex-selective abortion and abortion generally are morally wrong. Liao’s 
important work on this topic, as well as his writing on a variety of other subjects, 
merits careful attention.
Christopher Kaczor, Ph .D. 
The Catholic University of America 
Washington, D.C.
7 For more on this argument, see Christopher Kaczor, “The Violinist and Double Effect 
Reasoning,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 6.4 (Winter 2006):.661-669.
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